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APPLICATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
TO THE CIVIL COMMITMENT
PROCEEDING
Each year almost one-half million persons are admitted to state and
county mental hospitals in the United States;' of these, a substantial ma-
jority are involuntarily committed.2 The courts have been reluctant to
deal with the issues involved in involuntary hospitalizations. The reason
most frequently advanced for this judicial reluctance is that such pro-
ceedings are "civil" in nature and therefore do not activate the panoply
of constitutional safeguards which accompany a "criminal" proceed-
ing.3 Although involuntary commitment proceedings are ostensibly
initiated for the benefit of the individual, 4 they may lead to incarcera-
tion in an institution where treatment is increasingly recognized as
woefully inadequate. 5 Since the number of people currently in mental
hospitals greatly exceeds the number in penal institutions, 6 the invol-
1. H. Bethel & R. Redick, Provisional Patient Movement and Administrative Data,
State and County Mental Hospital Inpatient Services, July 1, 1970-June 30, 1971,
Statistical Note 60, Survey and Reports Section, National Institute of Mental Health,
at 2 (1972).
HEREINAFTER THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS
NOTE:
Leifer, The Competence of the Psychiatrist to Assist in the Determination of In-
competency: A Skeptical Inquiry into the Courtroom Function of Psychiatrists, 14
SYRAcusE L. REV. 564 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Leifer];
Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric
Examination: On Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 HARv. L. REv.
648 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant].
2. THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 17 (rev. ed. S. Brakel & R. Rock
1971). See also Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 87th Cong.,
lst Sess., pt. 1, at ii, 43 (1961).
3. See, e.g., Sorter v. Austen, 221 Ala. 481, 129 So. 51 (1930); Sporza v. German
Say. Bank, 192 N.Y. 8, 84 N.E. 406 (1908). This distinction has not, however, been
universally accepted. See, e.g., Reade v. Halpin, 193 App. Div. 566, 569, 184 N.Y.S.
438, 439-40 (3d Dep't 1920); notes 16-18 infra and accompanying text. See generally
Note, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill: Due Process and Equal Protection, 35
BROOKLYN L. REv. 187, 198-202 (1969); Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and
the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87, 89 (1967).
4. See notes 19-25 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 26-27 infra and accompanying text.
6. In 1970 the resident penal population for federal and state prisons approached
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untary hospitalization process warrants close scrutiny to determine
whether it is in accord with fundamental constitutional safeguards.'
This Note will therefore first examine the applicability of the basic
constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of his liberty
without due process of law to the involuntary hospitalization or "civil"
commitment proceeding.8 Because the medical expert exerts enor-
mous influence over the decision to commit an individual, both the
precise nature of his role in the commitment process and his ability to
perform that function will be outlined. Finally, the fact that the medi-
cal expert's function is currently centered upon a psychiatric interview
with the individual subjected to the commitment proceeding necessi-
tates a determination of the extent to which the subject may avoid such
an examination by invoking the safeguards of the fifth amendment.'
INVOLUNTARY "CIVIL" COMMITMENT AND DUE PRocEss OF LAW
The decision as to whether an individual is to be committed may
be made by a court, an administrative tribunal, or a panel of physi-
cians. 10 Regardless of the nature of the committing body, due process
requires that when there is a danger of deprivation of life, liberty or
property there must exist "that kind of procedure. . . which is suita-
ble and proper to the nature of the case."" At a minimum, this means
that every person must have a fair hearing, with notice, if he is threat-
ened with civil commitment.'" Beyond this basic guarantee of a fair
hearing, there is a significant dilution of constitutional protections.
200,000. 1972 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 161. This compares
with a resident patient population for mental hospitals of 338,000 in the same year.
1970 National Institute of Health Statistics, reprinted in 1973 WORLD ALMANAC 961.
See also Statement of Senator Alexander Wiley, 1961 Hearings, supra note 2, at 11.
7. See generally Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally
1ll: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107 (1972);
Symposium, Lawyers and Psychiatrists in the Court: Issues on Civil Commitment, 32
MD. L. REV. 3 (1972); Symposium, The Legal Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 23
SYRACusE L. REv. 991 (1972); Note, Alcoholics and the Mentally llh Their Institu-
tionalization and De-institutionalization, 7 REAL PROPERTY PROB. & TRIAL J. 532
(1972); Note, Involuntary Civil Commitment-A Constitutional Right to Treatment,
23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 125 (1972); Note, Wyatt v. Stickney-A Constitutional Right to
Treatment for the Mentally i11, 34 U. PrT. L. REv. 79 (1972).
8. See U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
9. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
10. F. LINmAN & D. McINTYm', THm MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 16-17
(1961).
11. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 289 (1883). See also Hagar v. Reclamation
Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884).
12. See Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 437 (1901). See also Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Chaloner v. Sherman, 242 U.S. 455
(1917). But see Fhagen v. Miller, 357 Misc. 2d 163, 317 N.Y.S.2d 128 (Sup. Ct.
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The most persistent justification for the relaxation of constitu-
tional safeguards in this area has been that an involuntary hospitaliza-
tion proceeding-because of its "civil" character-requires a lesser de-
gree of constitutional protection than does a "criminal" proceeding.'"
Thus, in Robinson v. California'4 the Supreme Court suggested that a
state might appropriately commit a mentally ill individual through a
"civil" proceeding.' 5 Based on the tacit recognition in Robinson of
the importance of the "civil" or "criminal" label, it may be argued that
the constitutionality of current involuntary hospitalization procedures
should be measured against the relaxed standards needed to satisfy due
process in "civil" proceedings. However, this implied recognition of
the significance of the label attached to a proceeding was seriously un-
dermined in In re Gault,' where the Supreme Court applied broad
constitutional safeguards to juvenile proceedings; in so doing, the Court
rejected the application of the "civil" label as dispositive of the measure
of constitutional rights to be afforded the individual.' 7  Thus, the rele-
vant inquiry after Gault is directed to the substance and not the form
of the proceedings. 18
The second justification for involuntary commitment without full
constitutional protections may be described as the "beneficent theory
of state action." The essence of this approach is that, since the motives
of the state are beneficent and have as their objective the treatment of
1970) (due process is not offended by a temporary confinement, without prior no-
lice or hearing, if immediate action is necessary for the protection of society or the
welfare of the individual). Procedures in which the patient is given neither notice nor
hearing until after hospitalization have been upheld. See, e.g., Sporza v. German Say.
Bank, 192 N.Y. 8, 84 N.E. 406 (1908). Contra, State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax,
364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72 (1954). It has been noted that such hearings are fre-
quently conducted at the hospital while the patient is under the influence of his treat-
ment, a procedure that should be condoned only if the person poses an immediate
threat to himself or others. See Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally 1Il: The-
ories and Procedures, 79 HAv. L. Rnv. 1288, 1292 (1966). When the hearing is
deferred until after commitment, the patient is likely to have considerable difficulty
in asserting his rights. See Comment, The New Mental Health Codes: Safeguards
in Compulsory Commitment and Release, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 977, 980 (1967).
13. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
14. 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (dictum).
15. Id. at 666. See also Note, supra note 12, at 1291.
16. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. Id. at 49-50.
18. Gault may be narrowly read to rest primarily on the similarity of the conse-
quences which may flow from the juvenile proceeding to those of the adult criminal
proceeding. In each case, the offender is threatened with incarceration in a penal-
type institution. See Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant 662. However, the Su-
preme Court has not confined Gault to its facts. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605,
608 (1967).
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the individual, excessive preoccupation with legal safeguards may frus-
trate the legitimate state interest in the mental health of its citizens. 19
Essential to this justification is the premise that mental health laws are
motivated by a philosophy substantially different from that which
shapes the criminal laws;20 insofar as the traditional criminal
law objectives of deterrence and retribution are not present in the civil
commitment proceeding, the state clearly assumes a less antagonistic
posture toward the individual.2' For this reason, certain procedural
protections traditionally associated with the criminal prosecution may
appear superfluous when applied to the involuntary hospitalization
proceeding.22 Furthermore, rigid adherence to legal safeguards may
not only undermine the treatment of the individual, but may actually
do him positive harm.23 This argument recognizes the existence of
"medical"--as opposed to "legal"-rights24 and views commitment pri-
marily as a medical decision.25
19. See Note, Hospitalization of the Mentally 11l, supra note 3, at 198; Note, Civil
Restraint, supra note 3, at 88. For an articulate expression of concern that formalistic
legal procedures may obstruct the treatment of an individual, see the statement of Dr.
Zigmond M. Lebensohn, Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally ll Before
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 25-26 (1970).
20. Kittrie, Compulsory Mental Treatment and the Requirements of "Due Proc-
ess," 21 Omo ST. L. Rav. 28, 51 (1960).
21. Correction, deterrence, reform, and retribution are frequently listed as the
principal objectives of imprisonment. See generally L. WhiNR , CW MAL LAw 437-57
(1969).
22. The jury has been attacked as being the "legal safeguard most exemplary of
excessive legalism in the commitment process." Comment, Analysis of Legal and
Medical Considerations in Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 56 YA..E L.J. 1178, 1192
(1947).
23. See Crawfis, Civil Rights and Mental Hospital Administration, 9 CLaEv.-MR.
L. REv. 417 (1960). The author observes:
It is certainly in accordance with good legal principles that a person, whose
legal rights are being adjudicated, has a right to defend himself. However,
for many patients, particularly the paranoid individual, the testimony of rela-
tives or friends or physicians concerning his symptoms may only further con-
vince him that he is being persecuted and that everyone is against him.
Thus, it is not surprising that the patient comes to believe that the staff of
the hospital are participants in this plot, and for this reason he is unable and
unwilling to cooperate and to participate in the process of diagnosis and
treatment. Id. at 419.
See also Ross, Commitment of the Mentally 1ll: Problems of Law and Policy, 57
MICH. L. Rav. 945, 966 (1959). While this argument identifies a siguificant problem,
it begs the essential question since it assumes that the individual is mentally ill.
24. See 1961 Hearings, supra note 2, at 80-81.
25. It has been argued that prime authority during the initial stages of the commit-
ment process should therefore lie in the hands of a physician. Comment, supra note 22.
Furthermore, it is often suggested that minimizing the legal requirements may serve a
desirable therapeutic function by convincing the individual he is being treated rather
than punished. Note, Constitutionality of Nonjudicial Confinement, 3 STAN. L. Rv.
109, 110 (1950).
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The "beneficent theory of state action," however, has come under
increasing attack. The principal objection goes to the nature of the
treatment received by persons in mental institutions, and implies
that civil commitment may amount to a life sentence in an institution
markedly similar to a prison.2 6 Critics of the theory contend that men-
tal institutions serve a primarily custodial function and that claims of
successful treatment are often iUusory. 7 To the extent that the indi-
vidual fails to receive treatment after he has been committed, the "bene-
ficent theory of state action" is invalid.
Several courts have suggested that the full range of procedural
safeguards formerly reserved to criminal cases might be constitutionally
required when inadequacy of treatment is demonstratedY.28 Further-
more, it has been argued that any deprivation of liberty should auto-
matically trigger these greater constitutional protections.2 While neither
26. See Szasz, Psychiatry, Ethics, and the Criminal Law, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 183,
196 (1958); Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant 662; Note, Civil Restraint, supra
note 3, at 98. The petitioner must generally prove he is sane in order to obtain his
release. See cases cited in Comment, Due Process for All-Constitutional Standards
for Involuntary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. Cm. L. Rav. 633, 635 n.7
(1967). For a general discussion of the similarities between mental hospitals and
prisons, see E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS IN THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PA-
TrENTS AND OTHER INMATES (1961). When the individual is committed he may lose
his right to vote and his right to enter contracts. See F. LINDMAN & D. McINTYRE,
supra note 10, at 263-97; T. SzAsZ, LAW, LrEERTY AN PsYcHIATRY 40-41 (1969).
27. For a severe indictment of one state's mental institutions, see Wyatt v. Stick-
ney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971), where the court stated:
There can be no legal (or moral) justification for the State of Alabama's
failing to afford treatment-and adequate treatment from a medical stand-
point-to the . . . patients who have been civilly committed . . . for treat-
ment purposes. To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic
theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail
to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due process.
Although Alabama ranks fiftieth among the states in per-patient expenditures per day,
id. at 784, the American Psychiatric Association has suggested that every public men-
tal institution in the United States is "inadequately" staffed. See Rouse v. Cameron,
373 F.2d 451, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Note, Involuntary Civil Commitment,
supra note 7, at 136; Note, Civil Restraint, supra note 3, at 88.
28. People v. Fuller, 24 N.Y.2d 292, 302-03, 300 N.Y.S.2d 102, 107-08 (1969)
(civil commitment of narcotics addict):
If compulsory commitment turns out in fact to be a veneer for an extendedjail term and is not a fully developed, comprehensive and effective scheme,
it will have lost its claim to be a project devoted solely to curative ends. It
will then take on the characteristics of [a] normal jail sentence, with a side
order of help. The moment that the program begins to serve the traditional
purposes of criminal punishment, such as deterrence, preventive detention,
or retribution, then the extended denial of liberty is simply no different from
a prison sentence and the constitutional guarantees applicable to criminal
proceedings will apply in full measure.
See also Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stick-
ney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Note, Civil Restraint, supra note 3,
at 87-92.
29. See, e.g., Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 ClUM. L. BuLL. 101
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of these broad propositions has been accepted by the courts,8 0 it is
clear that, at a minimum, the label attached to a proceeding is no
longer dispositive of the extent to which constitutional safeguards are
required in that proceeding." It is also clear that as institutional
treatment becomes more obviously inadequate, the involuntary commit-
ment proceeding increasingly resembles a traditional criminal proceeding;
therefore the subject of the hearing may be entitled to an increasing de-
gree of constitutional protection.
THE ROLE OF THE MEDICAL EXPERT AND THE PSYCHIATRIC
INTERVIEW IN CIVIL COMMITMENT
The growth in the power and prestige of psychiatry and the role of
the medical expert in the civil commitment proceeding has been marked
in recent years,3 2 yet relatively few checks have been developed to
regulate this expanding influence and ensure the accuracy of medical
testimony. Given this essentially unregulated role, questions arise as
to whether the current influence of the medical expert 3 and the use of
(1971). Under this view, the effectiveness of the treatment is not relevant when the
issue is the deprivation of an individual's liberty; certainly incarceration, whether in a
prison, juvenile detention home or mental hospital, involves such a deprivation of
liberty. As one court has noted, "[n]o matter how sweetly disguised or delicate the
language, involuntary confinement is a loss of freedom." Application of Neisloss,
8 Misc. 2d 912, 913, 171 N.Y.S.2d 875, 876 (West Co. Ct. 1957).
At least one high state tribunal, in rejecting both the labeling process and the
"beneficent theory of state action," has held that the rules governing commitment
should be the same in a "civil" as in a criminal proceeding. Denton v. Common-
wealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964). The court observed that:
[W]hen a proceeding may lead to the loss of personal liberty, the defendant
in that proceeding should be afforded the same constitutional protection as is
given to the accused in a criminal prosecution. Id. at 682.
It has even been suggested that the mentally ill individual may be in need of more
extensive procedural protections than the criminal defendant since he is less likely to
understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him. F. LINDMAN
& D. McINTYRE, supra note 10, at 29.
30. See People v. Studdard, 51 Ill. 2d 190, 281 N.E.2d 678 (1972); note 3
supra.
31. See notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text.
32. See Leifer 564. In reaction to the recent marked growth in the power and
prestige of the medical expert in the commitment proceeding, one commentator ob-
served: "iThere are two basic ways in which a person may be penalized in our
present society. One is by running afoul of the law. The other is by running afoul
of psychiatrists." Szasz, Civil Liberties and the Mentally Ill, 9 CLEV.-MAR. L. RaY.
399, 406-07 (1960).
33. Within the context of this Note, the term "medical expert" is used to signify a
person qualified under the laws of a particular jurisdiction to conduct a mental exami-
nation of an individual and report on his findings to a court. In practice, any li-
censed physician is usually statutorily qualified to conduct such an examination. See,
e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAw §§ 2(18), 124 (McKinney Supp. 1970) (licensed
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his principal diagnostic tool-the psychiatric interview-may consti-
tute a violation of the subject's fifth amendment rights.
The Influence of the Medical Expert in the Civil Commitment Proceed-
ing
To a considerable degree, the importance of the medical expert in
the involuntary hospitalization proceeding may be attributed to the
methods of psychiatric analysis and technique. Attorneys, judges and
juries are often confused and bewildered by the testimony of the medi-
cal expert.3 4 Because civil commitment is a "non-adversary" proceed-
ing,3 6 experts play the dominant role, and what constitutes "success" for
physician in practice for three years); Osno REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.01, 5122.14 (Page
1970) (individual licensed to practice medicine in the state); TEx. REV. CIv. ST. ANN.,
at arts. 5547-4, -32 (Vernon 1958) (individual licensed to practice medicine in the
state); WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 71.02.010, 71.02.170 (1962) (individual licensed
to practice medicine in the state).
Since most physicians are unfamiliar with mental illness and psychotic behavior,
yet qualify as "experts," it seems anamolous not to qualify the clinical psychologist as
an examiner. In criminal cases it is clear that the competence of an individual to
diagnose and testify as to mental disorders "does not depend on his claim to the title
of psychologist or psychiatrist." United States v. Riggleman, 411 F.2d 1190, 1191
(4th Cir. 1969). See also Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
Hidden v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 217 F.2d 818, 820 (4th Cir. 1954); Sandow v. Weyer-
haeuser Co., 252 Ore. 377, 449 P.2d 426 (1969); People v. Pennington, 66 Cal. 2d
508, 426 P.2d 942, 58 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1967). Psychologists have been qualified
as experts in proceedings to release persons who previously had been civilly com-
mitted. See In re Masters, 216 Minn. 553, 13 N.W.2d 487 (1944). Further-
more, many experts argue that mental disorders and their diagnosis are not "medical"
problems at all, but rather "behavioral" problems. See, e.g., Reese v. Naylor, 222 So. 2d
487, 489 (Fla. 1969). See generally J. COLEMAN, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND
MODERN LvaF 14-22 (3d ed. 1964); Levitt, The Psychologist: A Neglected Legal Re-
source, 45 IND. L.J. 82 (1969).
The more modern and enlightened "civil" commitment statutes do qualify psy-
chologists as competent to perform the mental examination. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE 99 5251, 6507 (West 1972). Significantly, in other areas legislatures and
courts have been unable to distinguish between psychiatrists and psychologists in terms
of their dealing with the mentally ill. Thus many states recognize a "psychotherapist-
patient" privilege for communications made to certified members of either profession.
See CAL. EviD. CODE § 1010 (West 1972). See also FED. R. EviD. 504(a) (2) (pro-
posed). In addition, several states have long recognized a psychologist-patient privi-
lege, and have only very recently adopted a more restricted psychiatrist-patient privi-
lege. Compare KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 319.11 (1972) and TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-
1117 (1955) with KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.215 (1972) and TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 24-112 (1972).
34. For an excellent examination of the role and function of the attorney in the
commitment of the mentally ill, see Cohen, The Function of the Attorney in the
Commitment of the Mentally IIl, 44 Tax L. Rav. 424 (1966).
35. Id. at 448. See also Comment, The New Mental Health Codes: Safeguards
in Compulsory Commitment and Release, 61 Nw. U.L. RPv. 977, 981 (1967).
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the attorney is neither clearly defined nor readily ascertainable.8" As
a result, counsel frequently adopts a deferential attitude toward the
medical expert and performs merely a ceremonial function in the pro-
ceeding.87  The court is seldom less confused than counsel-one judge
has described the judicial reliance upon expert testimony as follows:
[W]e are guided almost 100 percent by what the medical examiners testi-
fy to. I find my role with respect to that is mostly relegated to a discus-
sion with the medical examiner as to various possibilities that might be
available for the patient that they consider to be mentally ill. I hardly
conceive of myself, as putting myself up as a better medical expert than
the examiners and saying "You think this man is mentally ill but I
don't."38
Judicial deference to the medical expert may be even more extreme in
those jurisdictions where involuntary hospitalization is largely based on
the certification of one or more physicians. In these situations the task
of the judge is frequently reduced to verifying the accuracy of the
physicians' signatures. 9 Given the passive role currently played by
courts and counsel in the proceeding, the quality of the psychiatric
testimony assumes critical importance.
The medical expert's status as an expert witness is based upon the
assumption that his "scientific" credentials enable him to effectively
evaluate and explain human behavior a.4  However, the essence of a
science is the objectivity of its investigations and conclusions; to the ex-
tent that a psychiatric diagnosis is a subjective determination, 41 the sci-
entific status attributed to psychiatry by the courts is undermined.42
36. Cohen, supra note 34, at 448.
37. See id. at 450 (citations omitted):
Nearly every attorney interviewed in connection with this article took a
position of deference to the psychiatric opinion. "We have no choice but
to trust the psychiatrist." '"e hospital has an unlimited number of
doctors available to overwhelm any contentions raised by one who is, after
all, unfamiliar with psychiatry." This, of course, is in sharp contrast to the
situation when the lawyer feels "something is at stake." The encounters
between lawyers and psychiatrists during an insanity defense or a will contest
involving substantial assets are hardly deferential.
38. Testimony of Judge Reppy before the California Senate Fact Finding Comm.
on Judiciary, Admission Care and Treatment 13 (1965), cited in Project, Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 822, 860 n.207 (1967) (emphasis
added).
39. F. LmMAN & D. McINTYRE, supra note 10, at 33.
40. See Leifer 566.
41. Most persons currently in mental hospitals are said to be suffering from
schizophrenia-a mental disease diagnosed entirely by means of subjective interpreta-
tions of human behavior. 1970 Hearings, supra note 19, at 418 (statement of James
S. Turner and Robert Carr). Cf. Leifer 570-71.
42. It has been noted that the courts are themselves accustomed to and capable
of making subjective as opposed to scientific determinations. Leifer 570-71.
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Moreover, regardless of psychiatry's scientific status, the medical expert
may be performing a paralegal rather than a medical or scientific func-
tion in evaluating human behavior and the need for treatment in the
context of commitment proceedings.4"
Critics of the scientific status ascribed to psychiatry have noted
that the psychiatrist is able to disguise the limitations of his science by
translating the information which he compiles into a diagnosis replete
with technical jargon, thereby giving a spurious appearance of scientific
and medical authenticity.4" Undue weight may thus be given medical
testimony because of the apparently technical nature of the information
which it contains.45  The inevitable conclusion of the proponents of
this argument is that the medical expert's role in the civil com-
mitment proceeding should be much more narrowly defined. Alterna-
tively, the influence of the medical expert could be tempered by the
increased participation of both the bench and bar.46 Even if his role
were so tempered or redefined, however, it seems highly unlikely that the
medical expert's testimony would cease to have a significant effect on
the outcome of the civil commitment proceeding.41 Thus, it becomes
This line of argument suggests that the psychiatrist's claim to expertise-his medi-
cal training-may be irrelevant in the determination of incompetency or the need for
hospitalization. Id. at 572; cf. Levitt, supra note 33, at 83.
43. Leifer 569; Project, supra note 38, at 860.
44. Leifer 574.
45. See Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant 660.
46. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 34. For example, a prepared and confident
counsel, rather than adopting a deferential attitude toward the medical expert, should
be in a position to cross-examine vigorously the medical expert in a manner similar to
the one he employs in an adversary proceeding.
The medical expert should also be required by the court to avoid the simple ex-
pedient of labeling a mental disorder and instead direct himself to an analysis of the
individual's mental processes, including an adequate description of how he arrived at
his conclusions. See Salzman, Psychiatric Interviews as Evidence: The Role of the
Psychiatrist in Court-Some Suggestions and Case Histories, 30 GEo. WASH. L. Rv.
853, 859-60 (1962). See also Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269 (D.C. Cir.
1964); Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957):
Description and explanation of the origin, development and manifestations
of the alleged disease are the chief functions of the expert witness. The
chief value of an expert's testimony in this field . . . rests upon the material
from which his opinion is fashioned and the reasoning by which he progresses
from his material to his conclusion; in the explanation of the disease and its
dynamics, that is, how it occurred, developed, and affected the mental and
emotional processes of the defendant; it does not lie in his mere expression
of conclusion. The ultimate inferences vel non of relationship, of cause and
effect, are for the trier of the facts.
See generally Guttmacher & Weihofen, The Psychiatrist on the Witness Stand, 32
BOSTON U.L. RIv. 287 (1952); Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VAm.
L. Rnv. 473 (1962).
47. See notes 34-41 infra and accompanying text.
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necessary to examine the medical expert's principal diagnostic tool-
the psychiatric interview.
The Psychiatric Interview
Little special training is needed to recognize the obvious mental
disorder-a layman is usually able to identify the severely disturbed
person. 48 The difficulties in diagnosis exist in identifying disguised
mental disorders and those irregularities which affect only a limited
aspect of the individual's behavior.49 A diagnosis of this nature re-
quires a somewhat extensive examination of the patient; 0 under such
circumstances, the interview remains the basic diagnostic tool of the
medical expert. 51 The object of this interview is to uncover and ana-
lyze the subject's personality.5 In so doing, the medical expert may
unavoidably uncover feelings and attitudes which the individual does
not wish -to reveal to others.53  Hence, such an interview may not only
have an enormous impact on the subject's future; it may also penetrate
the essence of his personal privacy.54
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
It has been established above that it is now necessary to go beyond
"civil" and "criminal" labels in deciding whether to apply constitutional
48. Salzman, supra note 46, at 857.
49. Id.
50. As a general rule, a good doctor-patient relationship is a prerequisite to a suc-
cessful examination, and this may require that the individual receive assurances that the
results of the examination will not be used against him. Smith, Psychiatric Examina-
tions in Federal Mental Competency Proceedings, 37 F.R.D. 171, 172 (1964).
51. See Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1964), Krash,
The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense in the District
of Columbia, 70 YA L.J. 905, 918 (1961).
52. See Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Ill, 14 STAN. L. REV.
59, 83 (1961). See generally Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant 658.
53. See Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant 658.
54. Although many of the criticisms pertaining to psychiatric interviews would
apply as well to psychological testing, the psychologist's mode of operation may miti-
gate some of these criticisms. Whereas psychiatrists regard deviant behavior merely as
a symptom of the underlying "illness," psychologists focus on the behavior itself. Thus
the psychologist is less likely to probe into the subject's family history, infantile
development, or adolescent complexes; he therefore is less likely to intrude into the
sanctity of the individual's privacy. The psychologist also attempts to gain the confi-
dence of the patient, but without the deep transference relationship which is likely to be
shattered when the psychiatrist testifies. Furthermore, the reasons for the psychological
diagnosis, which is often based on projective testing and empirical data, may be more
easily understood and thus subject to challenge and cross-examination than are con-
clusory psychiatric labels based on more subjective analysis. See Levitt, supra note 33,
at 86; note 33 supra.
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safeguards.5 5 Furthermore, to the extent that the treatment received in
mental institutions is inadequate, 50 the consequences of the civil com-
mitment proceeding resemble those of the traditional criminal pro-
ceeding. Therefore, an increased degree of procedural protection may be
constitutionally required.5 7  Since the medical expert's interview plays
a central role in the commitment proceeding the question arises as to
whether the protection of the fifth amendment may be invoked to
avoid the compelled submission to the psychiatric interview.
Partly because it may mean different things in different settings,
there is no general consensus as to a single "policy" behind the privilege
against self-incrimination. 58  Historically, the privilege was narrowly
addressed to the right of an individual to remain silent whenever his
own speech might reasonably lead to a criminal conviction. It was
considered fundamentally unfair for the state to force an individual to
aid in its attempt to deprive him of his liberty.59 In addition, modem
courts and commentators have agreed that a second and broader func-
tion of the privilege 0 is the recognition and protection of an area of
privacy for the individual-a domain into which the state will not be
allowed to intrude.01 Although emphasized by the courts only re-
cently, the desire to maintain a proper balance between individual and
governmental interests was a major factor in the adoption of the priv-
ilege.0 2
55. See notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text.
56. See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.
57. See notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text.
58. 8 1. WIGMORE, EviDENcE § 2551, at 296 (McNaughton rev. 1961). U.S.
CONST. amend. V provides in part: "No person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself . . ." (emphasis added). For an ex-
tensive examination of the history, policy, and application of the privilege against self-
incrimination, see 8 J. WIoMORE, supra, H9 2250-84.
59. Forcing an individual to choose between self-preservation and the commission
of another crime (perjury) was felt to violate a fundamental respect for human dig-
nity. The early proponents of the privilege were also particularly concerned about
the widespread use of physical torture to extract incriminating admissions from sus-
pects. C. McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK OF THIE LAW OF EvIDENCE § 118, at 251 (2d
ed. Cleary 1972).
60. For a listing of the various policies which have been suggested, see 8 J. WIG-
moRE, supra note 58, § 2251, at 310-18.
61. This has been described as a "right to a private enclave where [the individual]
may lead a private life." United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir.
1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). See also Tehan v. United
States ex. rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966); Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege
Against Self Incrimination: Extorting Physical Evidence from a Suspect, 43 So. CAL.
L. REv. 597, 611-30 (1970); Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 472, 484-87 (1957).
62. See Ratner, supra note 61, at 484. The fifth amendment does not stand
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The Supreme Court has never addressed itself to the issue of
whether a mental examination conducted as part of a civil commit-
ment proceeding is a proper forum for asserting the privilege; 8 nor
may the question be answered by reference to the pre-enactment his-
tory of the fifth amendment. 4  Dean Wigmore's analysis of the avail-
ability of the privilege,6 5 which has to a considerable extent been
adopted by the Supreme Court, 6  distinguishes between non-
protected "real" evidence, such as blood tests, 7 voice exemplars,"" and
handwriting samples,6 and protected "testimonial" evidence, such as
alone in its protection of the individual from unwelcome intrusions by the state. See
Dann, supra note 61, at 601:
The first amendment prevents the state from interfering with one's freedom
to associate with whom he wishes; the third amendment limits the state's
right to quarter soldiers in the homes of private citizens; the fourth amend-
ment prevents unreasonable searches into one's person, home, or effects; and
the fifth amendment prevents the state from extracting damaging informa-
tion against the subject's will.
The author observes that, although there are a number of similarities between the
fourth and fifth amendments, they differ in the type of evidence which they prohibit;
the fourth amendment speaks of "persons, houses, papers and effects," and would
therefore appear to be limited largely to physical intrusions, while the fifth amend-
ment seems to be more concerned with psychological privacy. Id. at 601-02. Cf.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965).
Indeed, it has been held that there exists "a zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees." Id. at 485.
63. At least one state supreme court has, however, considered the question. The
Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Keith, 38 Il1. 2d 405, 231 N.E.2d 387 (1967),
held that the respondent in a "civil" commitment proceeding could not avoid taking the
stand and testifying by invoking the privilege against self-incrimination. The court
apparently did not conclude that the inadequacy of treatment facilities had made the
involuntary hospitalization proceeding similar to a criminal proceeding, and instead
adopted the rigid labeling approach rejected in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966). How-
ever, in a recent case involving the civil commitment of a "sexually dangerous person,"
the same court held that the possibility of a deprivation of liberty requires a measure
of due process protection. Although the court stated that full criminal due process
need not necessarily be superimposed on the civil commitment proceeding, the court
seemed to determine the extent of the applicable due process rights by considering the
consequences of the proceedings, see text accompanying note 29 supra, rather than by
an adherence to the strict civil-criminal dichotomy. People v. Studdard, 51 Ill. 2d
190, 281 N.E.2d 678 (1972). See also People v. English, 31 Ill. 2d 301, 201 N.E.2d
455 (1964) (recognizing that some statements to psychiatrists might incriminate
the subject).
64. For an examination of the history of the privilege, see 8 J. WOMORE, supra
note 58, § 2250.
65. See id. § 2263, at 378-79.
66. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
67. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
68. United States v. Dionesio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
69. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973). See also United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967) (requiring suspects to stand in line-ups).
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oral or written confessions. It has been suggested that the results
of a mental examination are analogous to those of a physical exam-
ination and therefore should be considered "real" evidence.7" How-
ever, it may also be argued-and this seems to be the more logi-
cal approach-that such evidence is "testimonial" in nature, since the
mental examination attempts to discover the thought processes of the
subject, and his often previously unexpressed feelings, through the
elicitation of verbal and physical responses.71 For several reasons,
however, categorizing information obtained as a result of a mental ex-
amination as "real" or "testimonial" is not conclusive and should not
foreclose fifth amendment inquiry. First, these classifications are
somewhat ambiguous.72  Second, Wigmore's approach to evidence
gathered by police for use in criminal prosecutions should not auto-
matically be extended to an uncharted area of constitutional law.
Therefore, attention should instead focus on the meaning and scope
which should be given to the privilege within the specific context of the
involuntary commitment proceeding.73
The issue of whether an individual may assert his privilege against
self-incrimination by refusing to submit to a psychiatric examination fre-
quently arises in the context of a criminal prosecution in which the de-
fendant affirmatively raises an insanity defense and then attempts to
assert his privilege against self-incrimination to avoid the compulsory
mental examination.74 Somewhat understandably, courts generally turn
a deaf ear to such an assertion,75 at least where there are adequate
statutory protections preventing the use of examination evidence against
the defendant during the trial.76 Clearly, a distinction must be drawn
70. See, e.g., Battle v. Cameron, 260 F. Supp. 804, 806 (D.D.C. 1966); Note,
Mental Examinations of Defendants Who Plead Insanity: Problems of Self-Incrimina-
tion, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 366, 372 (1967).
71. See Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant 655.
72. Id. at 653-54.
73. Cf. id.
74. See Comment, Changing Standards for Compulsory Mental Examinations,
1969 Wis. L. REv. 270; Comment, Compulsory Mental Examinations and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 1964 Wis. L. REv. 671; Note, Requiring a Criminal De-
fendant 648; Note, supra note 70, at 366.
75. See, e.g., Battle v. Cameron, 260 F. Supp. 804, 806 (D.D.C. 1966). The
court pointed out that it would be an anomaly to allow the defendant to raise the de-
fense of insanity, thereby placing the burden of proving his sanity on the government,
and at the same time to deny the prosecution the right to examine the defendant.
76. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970), which provides in part:
No statement made by the accused in the course of any examination into his
sanity or mental competency provided for by this section, whether the
examination shall be with or without the consent of the accused, shall be ad-
mitted in evidence against the accused on the issue of guilt in any criminal
proceeding.
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between the defendant who is attempting to prevent a mental ex-
amination after he has raised the issue of his own sanity, and the indi-
vidual who asserts the privilege after others have challenged his mental
competence."' If the privilege is to be denied in the context of the
involuntary commitment proceeding, it must be for the more funda-
mental reason that the individual, when subjected to such an examina-
tion, is neither in danger of incriminating himself nor likely to lose that
core of personal privacy guaranteed by the fifth amendment.
It may be argued that the individual cannot incriminate himself
when the aims of the state are beneficent and have treatment rather
than punishment as their objective.78 Moreover, the fear has been ex-
pressed that rigid procedural safeguards-including the availability of
the privilege against self-incrimination-may frustrate the commenda-
ble goals of the state, and as a consequence inflict harm upon both the
individual and society.79 Illustrative of this fear is the approach
adopted in People v. Fuller,8 a recent New York decision upholding
the admission of statements made during the course of an examination
of a narcotics addict pursuant to a civil commitment proceeding. The
court reasoned that, since the examination is solely for diagnostic
purposes, it is "for the addict's benefit, [and] self-incrimination be-
comes irrelevant.""' Thus, in the Fuller court's view, it is the non-
incriminating purpose of the examination which makes the privilege in-
operative. 2  The decision assumes particular significance because it
distinguishes Gault as involving a proceeding inherently criminal in na-
ture 3 and rejects the argument that an examination-even when used
Federal courts do not recognize a defendant's right to remain silent during a psychia.
tric examination. See, e.g., United States v. Allbright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968);
Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967). In state courts, the determina-
tive factor may be the availability of statutory protections preventing the use of the
psychiatric testimony against the defendant in court. See, e.g., State v. Olson, 274
Minn. 225, 143 N.W.2d 69 (1966). For an excellent examination of this issue, see
Comment, Changing Standards, supra note 74, at 271-76.
77. Cf. Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant 668.
78. See notes 19-25 supra and accompanying text.
79. See notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
80. 24 N.Y.2d 292, 248 N.E.2d 17, 300 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1969).
81. Id. at 302, 248 N.E.2d at 21, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
82. Id. Insofar as the beneficent theory operates, the broader right-of-privacy
function of the fifth amendment would likewise be outweighed by the very real state
interest in the mental well-being of its citizens. See notes 19-25 supra and accom-
panying text.
83. Thus, the New York Court of Appeals in Fuller read Gault narrowly as resting
primarily on the similarity of the consequences of the juvenile proceeding to those
of the adult criminal proceeding. See note 18 supra. The New York court appar-
ently was unwilling to draw the same conclusion as to the commitment of a narcotics
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solely for diagnostic purposes-must conform to the guidelines set
forth in Miranda v. Arizona. 4
If committed individuals generally received the type of treatment
offered by well-staffed medical hospitals, the Fuller court's view that
such persons could not invoke the privilege to avoid a mental examina-
tion would seem to be well-founded.8 5 But the "beneficient theory of
state action" has been largely discredited, leaving in its wake a broad
spectrum of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings to which varying
degrees of constitutional protection, including procedural due process,
must be applied. The purposes underlying the privilege against self-
incrimination-the right to remain silent when speech could lead to in-
voluntary confinement closely akin to imprisonment, and the broader
right to a zone of personal privacy8 8 -strongly indicate that an indi-
vidual subjected to an involuntary hospitalization proceeding should
indeed be entitled to invoke the fifth amendment against the "testi-
monial" psychiatric interview.
Practical Problems in Implementation
Since it would be difficult to ascertain the mental condition of an
individual without the aid of an examination,87 the availability of the
privilege s8 may create some obstacles to effective diagnosis.8 9 Un-
questionably, the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination
addict. It is not the deprivation of liberty which is significant under this analysis;
rather, it is the penal character of the institutions to which the offenders are sent.
84. 384 U.S. 436, 471-72 (1966). In setting up police interrogation guide-
lines, the Court stated:
lAin individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has
the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during
interrogation . . . . As with the warnings of the right to remain silent
and that anything stated can be used in evidence against him, this warning is
an absolute prerequisite to interrogation. No amount of circumstantial evi-
dence that the person may have been aware of this right will suffice to stand
in its stead. Only through such a warning is there ascertainable assurance
that the accused was aware of this right.
85. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971); People
v. Fuller, 24 N.Y.2d 292, 302-03, 248 N.E.2d 17, 21-22, 300 N.Y.S.2d 102, 107-08
(1969).
86. See notes 58-62 supra and accompanying text. One might argue that the need
for fifth amendment protection from abusive police interrogation techniques is much
greater than the need for protection in less coercive psychiatric interviews. However,
since mental examinations pursuant to involuntary commitment proceedings force un-
willing individuals to reveal their innermost thoughts, the psychiatrist's persistent and
manipulative questioning arguably is as reprehensible as physical coercion.
87. See notes 49-52 supra and accompanying text.
88. Note that the fifth amendment does not refer to "self-incrimination," but pro-
vides only that the accused will not be compelled "to be a witness against himself"
(emphasis added). See note 58 supra.
89. See Krash, supra note 51,
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would close off an important avenue of information. 90 However, obsta-
cles to the ascertainment of truth are the consequence of the exercise of
any privilege.91 The rationale underlying the fifth amendment is that the
values protected by the privilege justify the sacrifice of one avenue for as-
certaining the truth.9 2 The Supreme Court gave credence to the broad
privacy function of the self-incrimination clause by asserting that the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination "is not an adjunct to the
ascertainment of truth . . .but stands as a protection of quite different
values-values reflecting the concern of our society for the right of each
individual to be left alone."9 3 Thus, it may be argued that the rationale
of the fifth amendment requires that, when an individual may be incarcer-
ated for purposes other than the provision of fully adequate medical treat-
ment, the state may not force him to aid his own incarceration. This
conclusion is made even more compelling by the fact that the psychiatric
interview, although perhaps the most accurate diagnostic tool availa-
ble, is also an unparalleled invasion of personal privacy.
The immediate effect of making available the privilege against
self-incrimination would be to sharply reduce the role of the medical
expert in the involuntary commitment proceeding. While some may re-
gard this as desirable, the problem arises of finding a satisfactory sub-
stitute for the testimony of the medical expert. Currently, the psychi-
atric examination is the basic diagnostic tool for evaluating the mental
condition of an individual; if this is abandoned, more reliance must be
placed upon the testimony of third parties-particularly relatives,
friends and co-workers of the individual whose competence is chal-
lenged.9 4  An objection may be raised, with some validity, that listen-
90. Even though it has been argued that the objectivity ascribed to the medical
expert's conclusions is somewhat exaggerated, see notes 40-46 supra and accom-
panying text, the psychiatric interview remains the basic diagnostic tool for cer-
tain types of mental disorders, see notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
91. See C. McCORMICK, supra note 59, § 72, at 152.
92. Id.
93. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
94. Specifically, testimony of families, friends and co-workers may still provide the
basis for an evaluation of the mental health of an individual. Furthermore, it is
possible in many cases for a psychiatrist to make a diagnosis without actually inter-
viewing the individual. This may be based on long-term observations of the individual
or interviews with those who know him well. See Krash, supra note 51, at 918.
It is apparent that the development of alternatives to the compulsory mental exam-
ination has been frustrated by the use of the examination itself. "Mhe opportunity
to use psychiatric reports is conducive to the state's not seeking independent evidence
of the defendant's mental state, through witnesses with whom the defendant volunthrily
associated." Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant 660. See also Rollerson v. United
States, 343 F.2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1964). A classic statement on how direct interroga-
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.ing to the testimony of his family and friends to the effect that he
should be institutionalized may have a damaging effect on the indi-
vidual."0 However, a more substantial objection can be voiced against
the current use of psychiatric testimony. Given the close relationship
which must exist between the subject and the medical expert if the psy-
chiatric interview is to be successful, 96 the subsequent recommendation
of the psychiatrist that the subject be committed may undermine the
confidential relationship existing between doctor and patient and thus
frustrate subsequent treatment of the individual.97
Once it is determined that the privilege against self-incrimination
is available, the problem of devising an effective means for enforcing
the right remains. Confronted with a similar problem in Miranda, the
Supreme Court established elaborate guidelines requiring that the in-
dividual be informed of his right to remain silent and to consult with a
lawyer. s Unfortunately, the Miranda solution is not applicable to the
tion techniques operate to forestall the development of sophisticated alternatives, see
note 98 infra, was offered by Sir James Stephen: "It is far pleasanter to sit comfort-
ably in the shade rubbing red pepper into a poor devil's eyes than to go about in the
hot sun hunting up evidence." J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 442 n.1 (1883).
95. See note 23 supra. If more reliance is placed on the testimony of family and
friends, a problem may arise. The family of the individual frequently initiates the
proceedings, and to the extent that family members have a strong disposition favoring
his commitment, the credibility of their testimony may be questioned. However, fam-
ily members and friends are not clothed with the mystique of expertise, and a vigor-
ous cross-examination may reveal their predilections.
96. See note 50 supra. The clinical psychologist does not attempt to induce a
dependency transference, but rather diagnoses and treats his patients on the basis of
thorough behavioral analysis and conditioning techniques. See note 54 supra.
97. This criticism will be mitigated if the testifying expert is not the same psy-
chotherapist who will later be treating the committed patient. On the other hand,
a bitter experience in the mental examination may adversely affect any future psycho-
analytic relationship with the subject. Furthermore, to the extent that the psy-
chiatric interveiw is itself considered the first step in the treatment process, the
therapeutic value of that step has certainly been undermined.
98. 384 U.S. at 479. See note 84 supra. The extension of fifth amendment pro-
tection to the "custodial interrogation" has generated a significant amount of criticism
based on Miranda's supposed disastrous effect on law enforcement. See, e.g., Ervin,
Miranda v. Arizona: A Decision Based on Excessive and Visionary Solicitude for the
Accused, 5 Am. CRIM. L.Q. 125 (1967); Miller, Balancing the Rights of the Accused
and the Public, 53 A.B.A.J. 1046 (1967). However, subsequent studies have re-
vealed that Miranda's suspected impact was grossly exaggerated, and that indeed there
has been little change in conviction rates, the number of guilty pleas, or the disposition
of criminal cases. Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82
HARv. L. REv. 42 (1968); Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburg-A Statistical
Study, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1967). On the other hand, the fact that Miranda has not
had the feared adverse effects may in part be due to the lack of good faith police
compliance with Miranda guidelines. See Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The
Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1550-55, 1571-72, 1613-15 (1967).
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involuntary hospitalization proceeding, for its presupposes that the in-
dividual may intelligently waive his rights. Although the individual
faced with the danger of involuntary commitment is generally, in the
larger sense, presumed to be sane, this presumption should be reversed
for purposes of determining whether there has been an intelligent
waiver of rights prior to the mental examination. A presumption
against waiver would seem to be necessary to fully protect the indi-
vidual's fifth amendment rights. If such a waiver was determined
after the psychiatric interview to have been unintelligently given, a re-
hearing without admission of the psychiatric interview would protect
the individual's interest in not being forced to contribute to his own in-
carceration. This type of a rehearing could not, however, remedy the ir-
reparable injury inflicted upon the subject's personal privacy by the er-
roneously permitted psychiatric interview.
This does not mean that an intelligent waiver is impossible, for
mental infirmities as a general rule are not completely debilitating."'
Many psychotics-manic-depressive personalities, for example-experi-
ence transient periods of lucidity during which they may be quite
competent to intelligently assess and waive their rights. 100 Therefore
the presumption against the subject's ability to waive the privilege
should be rebuttable upon an affirmative showing that the individual
involved is competent to understand and waive his rights. Such a pro-
cedure would recognize the state's legitimate interest in treating the
mentally .ill, while securing for the subject of the involuntary civil com-
mitment proceeding the protection against self-incrimination and the
sphere of personal privacy which the fifth amendment guarantees.
CONCLUSION
The application of the fifth amendment to the compulsory psychi-
atric interview may prove to be a serious bar to involuntary commit-
ment. Whereas problems of proof, the lack of sufficiently developed
alternatives, and the lack of judicial expertise in the area of mental
health present significant difficulties, these must be balanced against
the strong suggestion that medical experts presently inject an excessive
99. See Postel, Civil Commitment: A Functional Analysis, 38 BROOKLYN L. REv.
1, 35 (1971). The author notes that "to demand of our commitment laws a definition
of 'capacity' in terms which are functionally related to the commitment operation is
not to impose upon the law a task which is alien or impossible." Id. at 36.
100. However, since these individuals can usually manage their own affairs,
they are committed only when "they become a serious public nuisance." J.
COLEMAN, supra note 33, at 313.
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degree of subjectivity into the truth-seeking process. Moreover, aside
from practical problems, every individual has a constitutional right not
to be "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self.. ... 0:1 In the application of due process safeguards, Gault man-
dates looking beyond the "criminal" or "civil" label to the substance of
the proceedings. In this regard, it is clear that many mental institutions
have so deteriorated that treatment has become inadequate at best,
so that hospitalization increasingly resembles imprisonment. Since in-
dividuals are typically confined on the basis of their own statements
and emotional responses to a skillful psychiatric interrogation, the fifth
amendment privilege should be available to protect against self-in-
crimination and to preserve an inviolate quantum of personal privacy.
101. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

